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This essay seeks to address the question regarding what conflict management techniques
have been implemented in the Great Lakes region of Africa, specifically in connection to the
Burundi political strife, and which technique is proven to be the most effective thus far. Since
gaining its independence in 1962, Burundi has experienced at least two mass killings as a result of
political and social contentions between civilian classes (Uvin 256). In hopes of preventing another
genocide between the Hutu and the Tutsi ethnic groups in the Great Lakes region of Africa,
national, regional, and international conflict management strategies have been implemented. In
this paper, I will argue that the most effective strategy of conflict management implemented in
Burundi is the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) because this African Union (AU) mandated
peace operation strikes a balance between national and international involvement than the
alternative techniques used such as United Nations (UN) facilitated dialogue and attempted
mediation through a third-party state. First, I will outline the relevance of this topic, as it relates to
conflict management techniques and genocide prevention. Next, I will provide a brief overview of
the history of conflict in Burundi in order to create a context within which to continue the analysis
of strategies implemented in this region. Third, I will provide a literature review of four important
sources relating to conflict management techniques in Burundi, examining their interpretations of
the situation. Finally, I will analyze the effectiveness of the initial UN investigations in Burundi,
the negotiations of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, and AMIB.
Having proved why the regional, militaristic approach is most effective in Burundi, I will end this
paper with suggestions for further research regarding how to better combat the problems in the
region through conflict management mechanisms.
Studying conflict management strategies in Burundi is crucial because, despite its
infrequent mention in genocide studies, Burundi experienced acts of genocide in 1972 when the
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Tutsi government systematically murdered approximately 150 000 Hutu civilians (De Maio 89).
More recently, UN investigations have confirmed acts of genocide reoccurring in 1988 and 1993
on the basis of the same ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi groups in the nation (Krain 174).
With this being said, it is evident that ethnic conflict in Burundi is lasting and previous conflict
management attempts have not alleviated the fundamental tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi.
The current situation in Burundi is complicated by the fact that the government in power, led by
President Pierre Nkurunziza, cracked down against journalists and civil society. Tensions remain
high in the international community because of the August 2015 assassination attempt against
human rights activist Pierre Claver Mbonimpa (www.un.org). Thus, it is increasingly important to
stabilize Burundi. In order to effectively aid Burundi, the conflict management techniques
attempted in the past must be reexamined. By investigating the benefits and flaws of each
technique, a more effective conflict management mechanism can be attempted. Alternatively, a
combination of strategies implemented in the past might be able to create a more holistic approach
to conflict management.
Similar to many other African nations, Burundi struggles to recover from a history of
colonialism. This colonial past created conflict between the Tutsi minority, which is economically
and politically affluent in the nation, and the Hutu majority, who were systematically repressed
under the Belgian regime (De Maio 89). The ethnic tensions pervasive in post-colonial Burundi
echo the sentiments of their northern neighbor, Rwanda. Burundi, however, was the first state to
experience acts of genocide in the year 1972. This genocide is seldom recognized despite the fact
that the Tutsi government in Burundi systematically killed approximately 150 000 Hutu, which is
almost twice the number of lives taken in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 (De Maio 89). Political
instability compounds with the nation’s struggle with ethnic tensions, creating a more hostile
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environment. Since gaining independence from imperialist Belgium, it has proven difficult for
Burundi to commit to a stable government that citizens are willing to accept. Patricia Daley,
Associate Professor of the Human Geography of Africa at the University of Oxford, provides a
brief overview of political instability when she writes:
Burundi has been highly unstable with six governments between 1962 and 1966,
the abolition of the monarchy (1966), four successful coup d’états (1965, 1976,
1987 & 1994), and the assassination of the first democratically elected president,
Melchoir Ndadaye, in October 1993 (333-334).
This description of the instability in the Burundi government exemplifies how dire the situation
has become, showing little sign of progress. This lack of progress is not a sign of lack of regional
or international effort, but more so it depicts the need for a tailored conflict management strategy
based on the specifics of the conflict.
There have been several conflict management strategies implemented in Burundi since
the escalation of conflict in 1993, including UN investigations, sanctions, ceasefires, third-party
intervention, a peace agreement. UN investigations began in Burundi to research the gravest
atrocities of 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991 and from 1993 onwards, which are now detailed in UN reports
(Schweiger 654). Unfortunately, the UN did not anticipate the repercussions they would receive
from their findings. After sending three international missions to Burundi, the UN classified the
events of 1993 as a genocide under international law, but almost completely avoided the topic of
the 1972 massacre that yielded a higher death toll (Schweiger 655). These findings created an
image of a biased international community which failed to recognize the 1972 massacre for the
systematic genocide that it was. Following the UN involvement in Burundi, regional states put
forward their own conflict management techniques to deal with the tensions.
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Regional states, such as Rwanda, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), and Uganda, attempted to use an economic blockade on land-locked Burundi as a means
of pressuring the regime to come to a peaceful agreement, but they soon learned that this would
not be effective. In order to pressure the regime in Burundi, regional states placed economic
sanctions on the nation from October 1996 until January 1999 (Daley 339). Unfortunately, this
created a huge backlash from the Burundi military, who launched a campaign against the sanctions
internationally (Daley 339). This embargo failed to incite change because it was affecting the
civilians far more than the elite who held the control in Burundi. The failed sanctions did not stop
the Great Lakes region from continuing to push forward their agenda of peace-making in the
nation.
Interventions in Burundi can be divided into three distinct phases. First, after Tutsi rebels
assassinated President Melchoir Ndadaye and several other high-ranking members of the
government in 1993, the UN became involved in facilitating negotiations of new power-sharing
arrangements (De Maio 94). Second, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania mediated the Regional
Peace Initiative, which included leaders from all of the nations in the Great Lakes region, from
1995 until his death in 1999 (Hendricks 15-16). Third, the Burundi government by-passed Arusha
committees by having closed door talks with South African President Nelson Mandela, who took
over the role of Nyerere after his death, which ultimately led to the signing of the Arusha Peace
and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi in August of 2000 (Daley 345). Despite the
aforementioned conflict management strategies were put into action, the situation in Burundi
remains tumultuous today. Scholars of Burundi, Genocide, and the Great Lakes region of Africa
provide analysis of the benefits and shortcomings of each conflict management mechanism.
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The political crisis in Burundi centers on long-existing tensions between ethnic groups
create lasting political, economic, and social problems in a nation. Studies of conflict management
in Burundi peak in roughly three stages. First, research on this effect in Burundi gained popularity
following the 1993 assassination of government figures, likely due to the international recognition
of this event as it related to the Rwandan Genocide the next year. Next, scholars turn back to
examining Burundi in the early 2000s to analyze the effectiveness of the Arusha Peace and
Reconciliation Agreement signed at the turn of the millennium. Third, an interest in the topic arose
again in 2015 as civilian protests erupted against incumbent President Nkurunziza in response to
his running for a third term (www.bbc.com). Most scholars agree that the conflict management
strategies in Burundi were flawed by design or execution. The following scholars represent the
main arguments in the academic community regarding how conflict management strategies should
adapt to suit Burundi’s current political climate.
Law and Politics Professor, Filip Reyntjens, focuses on the legal aspects of government
power-sharing in Burundi as part of his research conducted at the University of Antwerp. In his
2006 article “Briefing: Burundi: A Peaceful Transition after a Decade of War”, which was
published in the peer-reviewed African Affairs journal, he compares the power-sharing
arrangements of the 1993 government and the 2003 regime. Recognizing several challenges that
continue to face the government of Burundi, Reyntjens concludes that the situation in Burundi
today differs from 1993 because expectations have changed and there is active regional
involvement (131). Taking his work a step further, some authors choose to focus on the efforts put
forward by regional actors.
Isiaka A. Badmus, faculty member of the Department of International Institutional
relations at the International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (IUHSS), has written
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over fourteen works on the subject of African peacekeeping missions. In his chapter, “The African
Mission in Burundi”, featured in the peer-edited 2015 publication entitled The African Union’s
Role in Peacekeeping: Building on Lessons Learned from Security Operations, Badmus focuses
on the AU-UN collaborative effort to secure peace in Burundi through the African Mission in
Burundi (AMIB). After conducting interviews for this chapter in four African countries, Badmus
concludes that political strife in Burundi is a “centralist internal conflict” due to the centralized
control of state power in one ethnic group (113). Similarly, other scholars find the difficulty of
conflict in Burundi to lay in the ethnic tensions.
Jennifer de Maio, Political Science Professor at the College of Social and Behavioural
Sciences, agrees that the greatest challenge to peace stems from the deeply rooted fear that exists
between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups (90). In her 2009 book, Confronting Ethnic Conflict:
The Role of Third Parties in Managing Africa’s Civil Wars, which began as dissertation research
at the University of California, de Maio proves passionate about all of the ethnic conflicts in Africa,
not just the major ones, by including a chapter entitled “Intervention and Genocide: Burundi, 19952003.” Examining the role of third parties as a conflict management strategy to end civil wars, de
Maio argues that Burundi is complicated because it is difficult to classify the nation as pre-conflict,
in conflict, or post-conflict, as the conflict has remained constant for decades (91). Another
Political Scientist critiques the intervention methods in Burundi for being mismanaged due to the
complicated nature of the conflict.
Cheryl Hendricks, who is a member of the Department of Politics and International
Relations at the University of Johannesburg, wrote the peer-reviewed 2015 publication entitled
“South Africa’s Approach to Conflict Management in Burundi and the DRC: Promoting Human
Security?”. She argues that the approach South Africa takes to conflict management tends to fall
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short of achieving their mandate because they focus too much on the state and political elites.
Hendricks recommends that South Africa come to a better understanding of local opinions in a
conflict in order to incorporate civilians into the peace-making process (27). These four authors
provide comprehensive overviews of the conflict in Burundi and agree on which strategies have
failed at promoting peace, yet ultimately come to several different conclusions about which
conflict management techniques should be implemented going forward.
Authors Badmus, de Maio, and Hendricks stress the importance of influential regional
actors’ participation in managing conflict in Burundi. De Maio concludes that interventions in
Burundi have been somewhat effective thanks to the impacts of regional powers. She draws upon
the example of negotiating the Arusha Accords to show how influential Mandela was at conducting
closed-door talks with all parties in Burundi and coming to a peace agreement (De Maio 96).
Badmus furthers this by noting that regional actors’ ambition must not overshadow their actual
capacity to manage a conflict (127). He supports this recommendation by examining how the broad
mandate of AMIB achieved most of its mandate, but failed to facilitate effective Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and lacked civilian participation in the processes
(Badmus 138). Although Hendricks does not explicitly recommend the use of regional forces in
conflict management, she stresses South Africa’s influence in Burundi. Hendricks analyzes South
Africa’s conception of peace-building through the case studies of Burundi and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), drawing her to the conclusion that intervening states should learn from
their shortcomings to create an entirely new conflict management approach (18). Other authors
turn their attention to issues surrounding the electoral system in Burundi and how the impacts the
legitimacy of the transitional government.
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De Maio and Reyntjens’ works both analyze the effectiveness of power-sharing in the
government, meaning having the authority split proportionally between the two main ethnic groups
in Burundi. Reyntjens provides an in depth analysis of the differences between power-sharing in
1993 and 2003, concluding that there are many new challenges facing the nation given the time
passed without a stable government and new international involvement (132). Contrastingly, de
Maio take a more holistic approach. She examines the combination of military intervention,
regional negotiations, and electoral reform in her writing. De Maio holds that a combination of
strategies is needed to support a comprehensive peace in the region (111). Regardless of
ideological differences, both of these authors recommend the continued effort to have effective
power-sharing in Burundi as a means of reducing pervasive ethnic tensions in the Great Lakes
region.
Finally, most of the authors also recommend the involvement of civilians in the conflict
management process to create a lasting peace. Badmus, de Maio, and Hendricks all agree that it is
necessary for civilians’ voices to be heard in order to avoid the rebellions and civil unrest
experienced in the past. This suggestion proves the effectiveness of researching the flaws of
conflict management strategies as a means of mitigating the problems that have arisen in the past.
Hendricks notes that, in order to secure lasting peace, the African philosophy of Ubuntu
(humanity) must be used to promote human rights and security for the people of Burundi (12).
Civilian participation, which has been lacking in previously implemented conflict management
strategies would be beneficial to Burundi by reducing the likelihood of civilian unrest. Of the
conflict management strategies analyzed by the four aforementioned authors, three important
examples are brought forward, namely UN investigations post-1993, negotiations of the Arusha
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, and the AMIB.
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The least effective conflict management strategy in Burundi was the UN assistance with
the framework of a transitional government amidst civil war. After the assassination of President
Ndadaye in October 1993, the UN facilitated dialogue with the government of Burundi in order to
come to a power-sharing agreement. In terms of conflict management strategies, power-sharing
refers to “dividing the institutions of governance between political parties and rebel movements,
in the context of creating a new constitution and democratic elections” (Daley 335). With the
objectives of preventing further political destabilization and restoring security in Burundi, UN
Secretary-General, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, began power-sharing negotiations on 25 November
1993 (Vandeginste 69). Abdallah held negotiations with the coalition of Hutu parties, Forces du
Changement Democratique (FCD), and the Tutsi opposition, Coalition des Partis Politiques de
l’Opposition (CPPO). By 10 September 1994, the Convention of the Government deal was struck,
mandating that a coalition government would consist of 45 per cent of CPPO ministers and 55 per
cent of FCD ministers (Vandeginste 69). Abdallah praised the success of reaching this agreement
quickly to establish a government that represents the two main communities in Burundi, but he
overestimated the influence of the agreement.
Soon after the signing of the international accommodation in 1994, the agreement began
collapsing. The president and national assembly were powerless in Burundi due to a vehemently
divided cabinet (Reyntjens 117). Additionally, the military controlled the fraction of state power
existing in Burundi in the mid-1990s. On 15 July 1996, a military coup restored former President
Buyoya to power, undermining the entire power-sharing agreement (Reyntjens 118). The powersharing agreement failed in practice because of the lack of consensus among signatories and the
prominent resistance to the agreement by Hutu and Tutsi extremists alike (Vandeginste 70).
Tensions escalated in June 1994, when Nyangoma established the Conseil National pour la
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Défense de la Démoncratie (CNDD) and denounced the imposed power-sharing agreement was a
violation of international law (Vandeginste 70). Ultimately, the UN did not achieve their aims of
generating an effective power-sharing agreement. Failure to complete their objectives suggests
that the involvement of the UN did not take advantage of timing and were the wrong mechanism
to use as a means of resolving an ethnic dispute in Africa.
Intervention by the UN proved ineffective in many respects. First, the international
involvement was limited due to the fact that there was no mechanism in place to enforce the powersharing agreement. Since the UN mandate did not extend to peace enforcement, once the
agreement was signed by all parties in 1994 the international organization virtually disappeared
from the conflict-ridden government structure of Burundi. Due to the lack of enforcement
mechanisms, the government proved unable to maintain power and a military coup was successful
in taking over Burundi. The agreement, however, would have been more effective in helping the
government stabilize and maintain power if there was a mechanism in place to enforce the
ministers’ following of the agreement.
Second, the UN initiatives in Burundi are no exceptions to the common critique of this
international body, which is that it pushes liberal democratic values. As has been the case in other
African states, the implementation of Western liberal democracies does not appear accepted by
civilians, elites, and rebel groups alike. History suggests that consociational democracy and
Western ideals may just not be suited for Burundi. After a history of colonialism and fighting for
independence, it is likely that the people of Burundi would not take well to an agreement pushed
upon them by a more powerful institution. In this respect, more civilian involvement would
generate an agreement viewed as legitimate by the citizens of Burundi.
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Third, once the UN became involved in facilitating talks amongst Hutu and Tutsi elites
regarding power-sharing agreements, they failed to be successful. Although Abdallah stated that
he found the signing of the 1994 power-sharing agreement to be a success, this depends on the
accepted definition of success (Vandeginste 69). As stated above, the goal of a power-sharing
agreement is to create a new constitution involving all major disputing parties in order to restore
security in a state. The Convention of the Government stipulated how the ethnic groups would
distribute power in the government, but it failed to create a new constitution or restore security in
the state. In fact, security in Burundi decreased significantly when Tutsi and Hutu extremists failed
to respect the imposed agreement by the UN. The breakdown of this agreement largely suggests
that ethnic strife requires a more grassroots approach to reducing deeply rooted tensions, not a
mandate suggesting two opposing groups simply work it out in the parliament. Regional actors
sought to play a more comprehensive role in negotiating the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Agreement for Burundi.
Regionally facilitated peace agreements proved more effective than the UN involvement
in Burundi. Heads of State in the Great Lakes Region of Africa came together in the early 1990s
to create the Regional Peace Initiative, which called for the creation of a peace agreement in
Burundi (Hendricks 15). Negotiations for the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for
Burundi took place from early 1996 until the signing of the peace agreement on 28 August 2000.
The former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, given his international prestige and regional
leverage, facilitated the peace process in Burundi and advised regional governments in such a way
that made sure that conflict management remained a regional priority (De Maio 95). These
negotiations took place in two main locations: Arusha, Tanzania, served as the location for both
formal and informal consultations, while secret talks between the Burundi government and CNDD
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rebel groups were held in Rome, Italy (De Maio 95). Unfortunately, President Nyerere was unable
to achieve his goal of achieving peace and stability in Burundi due to his untimely death in 1999.
For the remainder of negotiations, South African President Nelson Mandela took over the
responsibilities of the late Tanzanian president.
Under the leadership of President Mandela, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Agreement for Burundi was signed in 2000. Mandela was integral in setting up a foundation for
the transitional government. The agreement stipulates the breakdown of the legislature, parliament
and national assembly, which led to the 2001 inauguration of the transitional government. Lasting
effects of the Arusha Agreement are noticeable throughout the early 2000s. The transitional
government, comprised of President Pierre Buyoya and Vice-President Domitien Ndayizeye,
developed a new constitution in 2005 embodying the principles of the Arusha Agreement
(Hendricks 18). Overall, the Arusha Peace Agreement appears to be successful in promoting peace
in Burundi, but the transitional government did not follow the proposed rules in practice. Thus, the
agreement was viewed as merely an unattainable ideal.
The negotiation process leading up to the Arusha Peace Agreement proved more
successful than the UN facilitated dialogue, which led to the dismantling of the government and a
military overthrow. Negotiations from 1996 to 2000 were more successful because they were
facilitated by a regionally and internationally endorsed figure. The involvement of President
Nyerere, and later President Mandela, allowed for the conflict to be dealt with in a more Afrocentric way. Despite successful and strategic negotiations, this strategy proved ineffective when
the peace agreement broke down shortly after implementation.
The peace agreement negotiations were problematic from the start, as many Tutsi
perceived Tanzanians to be pro-Hutu (De Maio 101). Although President Nyerere was thought to
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be a unique moral authority amongst the African community, dissenters would forever view him
in terms of his association with his home nation, which was seen as biased. Nyerere was known
for being opposed to coups, and was sympathetic to the Burundian Hutu refugees seeking asylum
(Daley 339). Similarly, Nelson Mandela has been accused of carrying with himself a personal bias.
Critics argue that Mandela viewed the conflict in Burundi through a South African lens, seeing
Tutsi as comparable to the whites in South Africa and the Hutu as oppressed like the African
National Congress (ANC) (De Maio 102). Unfortunately, these facilitators were unable to broker
a completely well-received peace agreement because of their personal perspectives.
South African involvement in the peace negotiations focused too much on the elite and
government figures in Burundi, instead of aiming for a ground-up method of peace that would be
recognized as legitimate by citizens. South Africa’s approach to the Arusha negotiations drew on
old practices of power-sharing, which focused exclusively on the state and elite members of society
(Hendricks 18). The Arusha Peace Agreement negotiations did not include civilians, which
explains the civic unrest present in Burundi. It would have benefited the Arusha Agreement to
include recommendations of Bashinantahe. This local arbitration has a long history and
understanding of being part of grassroots conflict management in Burundi (De Maio 102). With
this being said, citizens’ involvement in the conflict management process is valued culturally
amongst the Hutu and Tutsi, thus it would have been an asset if included in the agreement.
The biggest flaw of the Arusha Agreement is that there was no measure of sustained aid
in Burundi, which would have assisted them in accurately implementing the entirety of the
agreement. Instead of continuing to help the conflict management process in Burundi, South Africa
seemed to abandon them in 2009 because the country appeared to be stabilizing (Hendricks 19).
This is often interpreted as South Africa relinquishing control back to the UN Peacebuilding
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Commission and the newly elected Burundi Government to continue with ensuring human security
and democratization (Hendricks 19). This hindered the peace process in Burundi by having the
operations change hands again, and reducing the amount of regional involvement in the situation.
In retrospect, it is clear that regional involvement would have been beneficial during election
periods at least because, as was mentioned earlier in this paper, rebellions sparked again prior to
the 2015 elections.
The most effective method of conflict management in Burundi thus far has been the
African Mission in Burundi. On 2 April 2003, the AU deployed the armed peace operation of
AMIB as instances of armed conflict were on the rise and they were still awaiting UN
peacekeeping forces (Drumon 53). During December 2002 Arusha meetings, regional actors
concluded that mitigating the conflict in Burundi would be the first step to reducing violence in
the entire Great Lakes Region (Badmus 121-122). For this reason, AMIB was deployed in order
to supervise the ceasefire agreement and solidify the peace process in Burundi. African Security
Review comprehensively outlines the mandate of AMIB, writing that the mission was mandated
to:
Act as liaison between the parties; monitor and verify the implementation of the
ceasefire agreement; … secure identified assembly and disengagement areas;
facilitate and provide technical assistance to disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR) processes; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
co-ordinate mission activities with the United Nations’ presence in Burundi; and
provide VIP protection for designated returning leaders (Boshoff 41-42).
AMIB officially took place from its creation in 2003 until 1 June 2004, when authority was
transferred to the UN mission in Burundi (ONUB). During this time, the mission worked towards
completing almost all of its mandate, making it successful at reducing the conflict in Burundi.
Similar to previous conflict management strategies, AMIB was not without its setbacks. Unable
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to fully achieve its mandate, AMIB failed to effectively implement DDR and the AU’s ambition
was overshadowed by their capacity at times. For the purposes of this paper, success will be
measured by the ability for AMIB to complete its aims and to create a more secure environment
overall in Burundi.
AMIB proved that the UN and the AU could collaborate with each other to deal with
African peace operations (Badmus 112). The involvement of both regional and international
bodies gives this peace mission more legitimacy than UN mandated power sharing. As mentioned
previously, other conflict management techniques failed because of their lack of support from the
people of Burundi, but AMIB had the support of the Great Lakes Region. This recognition by
African nations served as reassurance to civilians and elites alike, reducing the likelihood that
AMIB would be another “quick fix” for their conflict sent in from the West. Acting as a support
mechanism for the Arusha Agreement, AMIB built confidence in the agreement though flexibly
handling new developments on the ground (Bellamy 193). This increased confidence in the
previous conflict management strategies, while actively combating rebel groups on the ground.
Militaristic enforcement of peace in Burundi proved more effective than negotiations and
peace agreements attempted in the past. AMIB consisted of approximately 3 250 armed members,
who worked tirelessly to maintain peace and stability during a civil war (Bellamy 166). When it
comes to conflict management, many individuals critique the use of military force as a means of
creating peace. In this case, however, this military operation was the first strategy that was truly
successful at stabilizing the political climate and reducing deaths in Burundi. Due to the armed
forces, AMIB was able to enforce the ceasefire agreement with something more deterring than a
piece of paper. Although AMIB participated in fighting on the ground, in attempts to create peace,
the only groups targeted were the opposition and rebel groups (Bellamy 192). These fatalities can
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be viewed as necessary for the greater good because they deter other rebels from continuing with
violent behaviour and protect civilians. Additionally, AMIB successfully supervised ceasefire
agreements in Burundi, which other conflict management strategies were unable to do.
With a total budget of $134 million, the African forces were able to provide substantial
protection of political figures in Burundi and deter the escalation of political violence that the
nation had become accustomed to (Badmus 128). Given the nation’s history of assassinations and
coups, protecting the leader who would be integral in making lasting peace in Burundi was
imperative. This de-escalation of violence also contributed to many parts of the mandate, including
protection of VIP politicians and monitoring the respect of the ceasefire.
The most remarkable success of AMIB was its ability to mitigate conflict and stabilize
approximately 95 per cent of the country (Rittberger 163). The presence of AMIB and the
deterrence strategies played a large part in reducing the physical violence. By this stage, the
conflict had been reduced only to Bujumbura Ruale, which was where the National Liberation
Front (FLN) remained (Peen 379). AMIB continued to provide peace and security by helping
refugees and internally displaced persons return to Burundi and receive the necessary humanitarian
aid (Peen 380). Such stabilization made way for the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 1545
on 21 May 2004, commissioning a UN Operation in Burundi (Badmus 126). Referring directly to
AMIB’s mandate, this was the initial intention of the Mission. The mandate outlines coordinating
AMIB activities with the UN Peacebuilding Commission present in Burundi (Boshoff 42). In this
respect, AMIB is a success. The mission completed the task of stabilizing the civil war-ridden
nation to a state in which the UN could send in a mission to further bring about peace on an
international level.
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In sum, this paper addressed the question: which conflict management technique, of the
three which are applicable to the political strife in Burundi, is the most effective and why? I argued
that the UN-AU collaboration with the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) is the most effective
technique so far because it has proven more successful at moving towards peace than UN
facilitated negotiations for a power-sharing government and the African-led negotiations for the
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. UN-negotiated power-sharing proved
the least effective strategy because it lacked a mechanism to enforce agreements, imposed values
that were not inherently African and the government structure broke down soon after. Negotiations
of the Arusha Peace Agreement were somewhat effective in reducing violence, but negotiators’
personal biases were regarded as negative by civilians, too much focus was placed on states and
the elite and there was no sustained aid to stabilize Burundi before regional members pulled out.
Overall, AMIB proves most successful because it was viewed by civilians as a legitimate coalition
by the AU and UN, there was regional involvement, the military was able to enforce ceasefire
agreements and 95 per cent of the nation was stabilized.
Since AMIB has been proven most effective in reducing violence amidst a civil war, it
brings about reason to reconsider the use of militaristic conflict management strategies. In the case
of Burundi, with such deeply-rooted ethnic turmoil, armed forces proved effective in deterring
military and rebel groups from breaking ceasefire agreements. AMIB was not perfect and did not
achieve its entire mandate. AMIB successfully reduced violence and prepared for the UN mission
to follow, but failed at providing effective measures for DDR and provided an overly ambitious
mandate. By analyzing the conflict management strategies used in Burundi, scholars are able to
see what worked well in the past and which methods were ineffective. Going forward, researchers
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can analyze the best hybrid of strategies to manage the conflict in Burundi and if this can be applied
to other nations with similar histories in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.
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